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THREAT CONVERGENCE: NEW PATHWAYS TO PROLIFERATION?



REPORT ON THE
NATO EAPC/PFP
WORKSHOP WITHIN
THE PARTNERSHIP
ACTION PLAN
AGAINST TERRORISM

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Threat Convergence: New Pathways to Proliferation?

Report on the NATO EAPC/PFP Workshop within the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism Zurich, Switzerland March 4-6, 2007

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The report paraphrases the remarks of the conference participants.

It was prepared by David A. Poplack and Patricia Taft.

Any errors or omissions are entirely the responsibility of the FfP and not the speakers.

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Introduction

Just as it was once unimaginable that foreign terrorists, using hijacked commercial airplanes as missiles, could attack significant targets inside the U.S. before September 11, 2001, the idea that “home-grown” terrorists armed with high explosives could strike deep into the heart of Europe was nearly inconceivable before the attacks on Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005. Since these attacks, the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO have worked to strengthen the counter-terrorism architecture of the international community to prevent mass-casualty attacks. However, as progress is made in international cooperation on issues of terrorism, the larger threat of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) proliferation and the potential for exploitation by terrorists has become apparent. While efforts to learn more about terrorist networks with “conventional” capabilities have yielded significant progress,* systematic investigation of CBRN-related terrorist activity has not attracted comparable attention. Specifically, the enabling environments that may facilitate CBRN proliferation have not been examined in depth.

The enabling environments present in weak and failing states (WFS), and in ungoverned spaces in strong states, may represent opportunities for terrorists who desire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). “Threat Convergence” refers to the overlap between WMD proliferation, terrorism, and such enabling environments. No longer bound by the rules of a system of states, a different world from that which was originally envisioned by the crafters of WMD policies and institutions has emerged. Threat Convergence challenges old notions of strategy, diplomacy, and statecraft, and requires more innovative policies, focused international cooperation, and strong leadership. Should the international community fail to adapt to a changed world, the destruction caused by the attacks in New York, London, Madrid, and Washington could be repeated, or worse, leaving nations unprepared for the grave consequences that could follow.

The Workshop

The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Department of State jointly sponsored the NATO/EAPC/PfP workshop on Threat Convergence, held from 4 to 6 March, 2007 in Zurich, Switzerland. The Fund for Peace provided expert support for the conference, which was attended by over 110 participants from the 34 states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP).§ The workshop focused on addressing issues concerning Threat Convergence within the EAPC/PfP Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP-T), a 2002 Prague Summit initiative to enhance cooperation and integration of

* Recent arrests, trials, or killings of key terrorists include: the March 10, 2007 Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing in Guantanamo Bay of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the confessed mastermind of the 9/11 attacks; the June 6th, 2006 killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia; and the capture of several dozen of the Madrid and London bombing suspects since 2004.

§ The EAPC and PfP are the primary international fora through which NATO extends its security cooperation beyond the primary membership. See <http://www.nato.int/issues/eapc/>

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Threat Convergence challenges old notions of strategy, diplomacy, and statecraft, and requires more innovative policies, focused international cooperation, and strong leadership.

Although the threat is significant, stable societies are less easily disrupted than terrorists might hope... strong countries have sufficient capacity to deal with such crises... even CBRN attacks may not incapacitate them...

Because the potential for Threat Convergence affects all nations and peoples, international cooperation against this risk must be immediate, robust, and imaginative.

efforts on counter-terrorism across EAPC countries.* This workshop is a contribution to the Action Plan by the Government of Switzerland.

Over the two days of the workshop, participants heard from expert panelists on the threats of CBRN terrorism representing governments and regional and international organizations. Participants were invited to discuss the risks and responses most pertinent to their governments and the most appropriate ways forward. This workshop built on the previous work of the Swiss Government to promote the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism, including several prior workshops including a 2005 workshop entitled "Public-Private Co-operation in Combating the Financing of Terrorism", and a 2003 meeting entitled "Cyber-security and Contingency Planning", both held in Zurich. It also built upon the work of the Fund for Peace, which had convened a large conference in the United States in November/December 2006 that brought together leading experts in the fields of weak and failed states, terrorism, and WMD proliferation to discuss the topic of Threat Convergence and possible scenarios.

Opening Addresses

The NATO/EAPC/PfP workshop opened with three welcome addresses presented by Ambassador Jacques Pitteloud, Head of the Centre for International Security Policy at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; Michael Hurley, the Senior Special Advisor to the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism at the US Department of State; and Dr. Pauline H. Baker, President of the Fund for Peace. Speakers began the conference by outlining the most important features of the new security landscape, with particular attention to the role of non-state actors who wish to inflict catastrophic violence on their perceived enemies. The framing question that opened the conference asked participants to consider how NATO and its EAPC and PfP allies could best address the fact that "micro actors can have macro consequences."

Because the potential for Threat Convergence affects all nations and peoples, whether as targets of terrorist wrath or unwitting intermediaries in their quest for WMD, international cooperation against this risk must be immediate, robust, and imaginative. The threat of an uncontrollable actor wielding WMD should spur all countries to action. Although the threat is significant, stable societies are less easily disrupted than terrorists might hope. For example, when Switzerland and Italy suffered severe power outages in 2003 and when Hurricane Katrina devastated large portions of the US south in 2005, these societies did not collapse. Because strong countries have sufficient capacity to deal with such crises, it was reasoned that even CBRN attacks may not incapacitate them, although the widespread fear and panic that could ensue in the aftermath would be considerable and dangerous. NATO allies must better understand the "constellation of motivations" within groups seeking CBRN weapons in order to both prevent and deter future mass-casualty attacks.

* See <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b021122e.htm>

Plenary Session 1

Threat Convergence: WMD Proliferation, Terrorism, and State Dysfunction: New Pathways to Proliferation?

Moderator:

Dr. Pauline H. Baker, The Fund for Peace

Panelists:

Axel Angely, Deputy Head, NATO WMD Centre

“Enabling and Problematic Environments in States of Concern – Which conditions pose which risks?”

Ben Hornung, Analyst, US Department of State

“Availability of Chemical-Biological Warfare Enabling Resources”

In the opening plenary of the workshop, a number of strategic questions were addressed regarding the use of language and terminology and how to frame the discussion, as well as substantive discussion on chemical and biological weapons for possible use by terrorists. For instance, what effect does labeling a country a “weak or failed” state have on its ability to deter terrorists and prevent them from establishing bases in its territory? Is it possible for WFS to meet some international obligations but not others? What should be done to strengthen the implementation of UNSCR 1540? Perhaps inter-regional or sub-regional support for states to enact appropriate legislation could be useful. Panelists urged that weak and failing states must be seen in the context of the wider international community, as neither geography nor sovereignty can serve as a buffer to terrorism and its potentially catastrophic manifestations.

On a more tactical level, some CBRN weapons can be developed relatively easily. The resources required to create chemical and biological weapons, for example, are readily available in daily life. Chemical components are accessible in industrial public production facilities and pass through population centers in bulk, which could make them good “targets of opportunity” for terrorists. Biological contaminants are present in many university labs and can easily be culled from livestock and developed at low cost “in a basement anywhere”. Terrorists need not necessarily employ CBRN weapons in order to disrupt stable countries and international relations. While some strong states may have the necessary capacity to prevent terrorists from using these materials for nefarious purposes, most weak states lack such capacities and thus must be helped to close security gaps.

Questions arose regarding the definition of WFS, the use and sharing of tactical intelligence, how to strike a balance between intelligence gathering and protecting civil liberties so vital to winning over disaffected populations, and why, if WMD

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“The goal should no longer be to simply cut off the head of the monster, for another will grow back, but to kill the monster...”

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* United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (adopted in 2004) calls on state parties to cooperate within an agreed framework to fight the threat of CBRN proliferation, especially to non-state actors, through existing measures (primarily export and trans-shipment controls and physical protection) and establishes a 1540 Committee to oversee legal, diplomatic, and security cooperation for the Council.

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terrorism is so easy, it has not yet occurred. The assumption that tactical intelligence cannot be shared because of its classified nature was challenged, with Kosovo cited as one theatre in which the sharing of intelligence among NATO partners improved over time. Panelists urged that a holistic perspective needs to be taken when viewing these multifaceted security threats, particularly because the abundance of “specialists” within diplomatic, military and intelligence circles have created conflicting policy prescriptions. For example, successful anti-crime efforts in Mali could simultaneously put people out of work and prepare them for recruitment by terrorists wishing to expand into the Maghreb.

Plenary Session 2

Threat Convergence: WMD Proliferation, Terrorism, and State Dysfunction: New Pathways to Proliferation? (Continued)

Moderator:

Ambassador Jacques Pitteloud, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

Panelists:

John Brennan, President and CEO, The Analysis Corporation

“Countering Terrorist Networks – Components of Effective Counter-Terrorism (European and American perspectives)”

James Forest, Director of Terrorism Studies and Professor, United States Military Academy, West Point

“Countering Linkages between Terrorist and Criminal Networks Capable of Proliferating WMD”

The second plenary focused on innovations in counter-terrorism measures. The counter-terrorism community must begin to view terrorism on a continuum, with “upstream” and “downstream” dimensions, much like environmental problems. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have significantly improved their understanding of, and ability to cripple, terrorist activities, making the “downstream” environment more difficult for terrorist operations. However, more needs to be done to counter the “upstream” causes of terrorism and frustrate the recruitment of terrorist operatives. For this to work, governments and international organizations must utilize “upstream experts”: social scientists and law enforcement officials who understand the broad social and political contexts which foster terrorism. There is a need to cross-train intelligence analysts and technologists to create an integrated IT system that is more user-friendly for people who need to access information. It was also suggested that the use of state-of-the-art visualization technology would allow agents to reference and contextualize the social networks of terror suspects so that intelligence can be acted upon more quickly and appropriately. Finally, counter-terrorism programs cannot be only military in nature and must work hard to ensure an “upstream” environment that does not violate the rights of those who are most important to the global war on terrorism: the ordinary citizens of Muslim countries from which terrorists are recruited.

The importance of trust was discussed also with regard to countering the “downstream” environment. The establishment of trust is simultaneously the most important facet of terrorist operations and the most vulnerable to counter-terrorist intervention. This is especially the case with hybrid networks between criminal and terrorist organizations that rely on the “trusted handshake” arising from shared prison or battle experience, or tribal or family relations. However, these hybrid networks are potentially divergent in terms of ideological affinity and tactical control, especially over the use of public displays of violence. These factors present opportunities for exploitation by counter-terrorism experts who may be able to sow seeds of distrust among members of such hybrid networks. By exploiting a highly sensitive but loosely managed command and control structure, distrust may be easier to

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Not all terrorist attacks are kinetic.

Can NATO members and its allies shift their campaign ...to win the information war?

promote than the trust necessary for penetration by authorities. These networks function on an assumption of reliability but with little real accountability, especially regarding the lowest common denominator of these networks, money. This leaves them open to disinformation campaigns on the part of law enforcement which can easily and cheaply affect the “street perception” of individuals and groups.

Questions arose about the strategy of sowing distrust among terrorist and criminal networks. In particular, how can intelligence and law enforcement disseminate misinformation without alienating local populations critical to fighting the war on terror? Perhaps an opposite strategy can be adopted with the “trusted handshake” giving radical Salafists an opportunity to defect, increase the natural mistrust between actors, and give law enforcement the necessary introduction that is critical to infiltration. France used criminal elements against insurgents in the Algerian conflict, although this method is often seen as too controversial and dangerous in the decentralized “global war on terror” environment. NATO was able to overcome its Soviet adversary in part by recruiting highly trained Soviet experts and is now embarking on the same process with terrorism, learning to use informational warfare.

Not all terrorist attacks are kinetic. At present, terrorists are gaining ground because they have clearly identified their targets in the information war, have successfully shaped the terms of the debate, and have extracted precisely the reactions they were aiming for from their adversaries. In order to counter the ideological component of a terrorist campaign, counter-terrorism policy makers and practitioners must wage a rhetorical and ideological battle as well. Currently, there are no viable “isms,” or competing popular ideologies, that can challenge political Islam, whether Sunni or Shiite, in the greater Middle East. In order to begin the process of constructing intellectual options for disaffected populations, counter-terrorism strategists must consult experts in social science fields that are outside of the security community. The question is can NATO members and its allies shift their campaign in time and with sufficient strength to win the information war?

Breakout Group 1a

Enabling Environments: Exploitation by Non-State Actors—Motives, Means, and Opportunities

Chair:

Axel Angely, Deputy Head, NATO WMD Centre

Rapporteur:

Mirko Giuliatti, Swiss Mission to NATO

Panelists:

Joan Armour, Chemical & Biological Defence Section, Defence R & D, Canada

Magnus Ranstorp, Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies, Swedish National Defence College, Sweden

John-Erik Stig Hansen, National Centre for Biological Defence, Denmark

Breakout Group 1a focused on the availability of CBRN weapons to terrorists for use on civilian populations. According to panelists, the use of chemical and biological weapons by terrorist groups presents difficult challenges to the counter-terrorism community due to the widespread availability of noxious agents and the relative ease of their use in offensive attacks. These agents are widely available in large quantities in both developed and underdeveloped countries, in research laboratories at universities, and in small and large scale commercial production facilities. They can be found in transit, or stored in mass quantities, in populated and under-secured areas throughout the world. The most readily available agents are vital to the modern medical, manufacturing, extractive, construction, and energy industries.

The documented use of common chemical and biological agents as weapons has a long history, from small pox attacks on Indians by the British in 1763, to anthrax-laden letters delivered to members of the U.S. Congress and prominent media personalities in 2001, to chlorine bomb attacks on civilians in Baghdad by insurgents in 2007. Chemical and biological weapons are the most widespread, easily procured, and deliverable WMD, as well as the most potent, deadly, and uncontrollable weapons available. Because of these factors, panelists urged that control of the threat of chemical and biological weapons is one of the most pressing counter-terrorism tasks. Due to the widespread and legal use of these agents, top down approaches would be inappropriate and ineffective. It would be preferable that market-based approaches to the control of noxious agents be sought and implemented on a global scale through international cooperation rather than an international verification protocol, for example. Also, using UNSCR 1540 to implement national legislation against trafficking in controlled CBRN agents is a positive action that could be taken soon because the basic agreements are already in place.

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Because of the widespread and legal use of [chemical and biological] agents, top down approaches would be inappropriate and ineffective. It would be preferable that market-based approaches to the control of noxious agents be sought and implemented on a global scale through international cooperation.

The Madrid train bombings of 2003 were cited as an example of the linkage of [immigration, terrorism, and organized crime] because the terrorist recruits who both enabled and carried out the attacks were legal immigrants involved first in the drug trade, then radicalized and recruited for terrorist activity.

Breakout Group 2a

Enabling Environments: Cross-Border Linkages between Terrorist & Criminal Networks

Chair:

John Brennan, The Analysis Corporation

Rapporteur:

Madeleine Bieri, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

Panelists:

Michel Hess, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute for Technology, Switzerland

Stefan Wailand, Federal Intelligence Service, Germany

Breakout Group 2a focused on the links between organized crime, immigration, and terrorism, and responses by law enforcement. The relationship between *illegal* migration and terrorism is not well known, but there appears to be some correlation between the two phenomena in Europe. However, there are established links between *legal* immigration and terrorism, including terrorist financing and the recruitment of second generation Europeans into terrorist circles. There also appears to be a link in some countries between terrorism and elements of organized crime with immigrants, especially related to the drug trade. The Madrid train bombings of 2003 were cited as an example of the linkage of these particular phenomena because the terrorist recruits who both enabled and carried out the attacks were legal immigrants involved first in the drug trade, then radicalized and recruited for terrorist activity. Immigrants can provide fund raising and money transfer opportunities, symbolic and material support to terrorists with similar backgrounds, and perhaps, material support for WMD capabilities.

In a world where territorial borders no longer serve to protect those within them, counter-terrorism strategies must help shape immigration policy. Several possibilities were outlined for how best to deal with this emerging problem. First, policy makers must clearly envisage immigrants and immigrant communities as allies in the struggle against terrorism. Immigrants should not automatically be regarded as potential terrorists nor assumed to be sympathetic to these groups in the case of shared origins with convicted militants. While many terrorists involved in recent attacks have been immigrants, the vast majority of immigrants have no ties to terrorism. Second, policy makers must be innovative in their approaches to financial counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism financing legislation does not necessarily prevent specific attacks or groups from acting. It can, however, seriously constrain the operating space of terrorist backers and hinder the free flow of money via legitimate and illicit channels to militant groups. It was underscored that an overemphasis on top down oversight will not impact terrorist financing as deeply as a market based approach, due to its informal and global nature. For example, promoting an “ethical labeling” standard for charities to verify that they are not funding terrorism may help to shape the preferences of donors and decrease the hurdles currently faced by

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legitimate organizations. Possible courses of action include focusing financial intelligence, oversight, and cooperation on informal systems- such as *hawala* banking, private foundations, gold and diamond brokers, and money transfers.

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Breakout Group 1b

Enabling Environments and Non-State Actors Capable or Motivated to Procure WMD

Chair:

Axel Angely, Deputy Head, NATO WMD Centre

Rapporteur:

Mirko Giulietti, Swiss Mission to NATO

Panelists:

Mathew Weeden, National Counter-terrorism Center, US

Gary Ackerman, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, US

Manfred Zoller, Federal Intelligence Service, Germany

Breakout Group 1b focused primarily on evaluating the likelihood of CBRN proliferation and use by terrorists, including their motivations and capacities for choosing such weapons. The desire of terrorists to acquire WMD is not in question. The world's most infamous terrorist, Osama bin Laden, wrote: "To seek to possess the weapons that could counter those of the infidels is a religious duty... It would be a sin for Muslims not to seek possession of the weapons [of mass destruction] that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims."* Besides documented cases of Al Qaeda affiliates attempting to purchase or transport materials for constructing WMD, statements such as these demonstrate the ideological context in which operatives or aspirants might try to acquire and use WMD. The motivation to use WMD is strategic, with terrorists seeking to disrupt economic and political systems by striking vital population centers in target countries.

The widespread availability of chemical and biological weapons ingredients was cited as a significant problem as well. Enabling technologies include the Internet that, while not imparting much specific technical or operational advice, lends itself to connecting actors and providing rhetorical or ideological support for their actions. Another issue raised was the suitability of WFS as enabling environments for CBRN weapon proliferation or construction. Troubled states could be too unreliable in terms of a facilitating environment to provide more than cover to terrorists seeking to build complex and dangerous devices. Nor are WFS necessarily sufficient for the acquisition of the raw materials needed to construct CBRN weapons. WFS, however, could aid in the transportation of materials or personnel, the acquisition of unsecured weapons, and in the recruitment, training, and operational protection of terrorists. By thoroughly analyzing the networks of known terrorist groups and assessing the facilitative environments they tend to inhabit, policy makers can better target assistance to local authorities to counter the spread of WMD technology and materials.

* Response to an interview question posed by Rahimullah Yusufzai, a correspondent for News of Pakistan, Time, and ABC, on January 10, 1999.

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Breakout Group 2b

Cross-Border Linkages between Terrorist & Criminal Networks - Possible Processes and Pipelines to Proliferation

Chair:

John Brennan, The Analysis Corporation

Rapporteur:

Madeleine Bieri, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

Panelists:

James Forest, United States Military Academy, West Point, US

David Mosher, RAND Corporation

Andras Telkes, Counselor, Government of Hungary

In Breakout Group 2b, the possibility of cooperation between organized crime and terrorist networks around WMD proliferation was examined, as well as the nature of these relationships. There has been an increase in the linkages between terrorist and criminal networks, resulting in the creation of *hybrid networks*, especially in Western Europe. Criminals have accumulated extensive knowledge on how to circumvent legal systems and authorities, and terrorists interested in WMD need this knowledge. Terrorists need finance and funding sources and specialized technical skills while criminals seek new avenues to profit. Both terrorist and criminal networks:

- Are highly adaptable, innovative, and resilient
- Require operational secrecy
- Make leaving the network difficult, rare, and often fatal

While these similarities may foster collaboration, they may also hinder close ties due to the exclusionary nature of these organizations. There do not yet appear to be permanent, organic links between terrorist networks and organized crime. There are significant differences between terrorist and criminal networks as well that hinder natural collaboration:

- Different motivations (ideology versus profit)
- Terrorists want to communicate to various audiences, will take credit for violence, and seek popular support
- Criminals do not want media attention, do not take credit for violence, and do not seek popular support

Overall, it is significant that surprisingly few nuclear trafficking cases have involved organized crime thus far. This could be due to the extreme risk involved relative to what might amount to a one-time payoff.

This risk and other barriers and disincentives to trade in nuclear weapons, materials, and knowledge have been much stronger than the incentives. The biggest barriers are geographic isolation, passport controls and access controls. Lack of information about buyers and sellers is also a serious impediment to forming a market. The

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Eastern and South-eastern Europe are not considered priority target regions by core Al-Qaeda fighters but could provide a safe haven used primarily for various ‘background terrorist activities’

dearth of information about potential suppliers in the FSU made it difficult for potential buyers to fulfil their demands, one reason the collapse of the Soviet Union did not precipitate a mass proliferation of fissile materials. Counter-proliferation and terrorism experts therefore, should work to exaggerate this “market imperfection” through disinformation campaigns to keep buyers and sellers “stumbling around in the dark.”

Eastern and Southeastern Europe present an interesting region in terms of the threat level and vulnerability to attack as compared to Western Europe for several reasons. Because the Muslim community is much smaller and possibly less disaffected in Eastern and Southeastern Europe than in Western Europe, it is much easier to detect radical activities, which are also much less prevalent. Eastern and Southeastern Europe are not considered priority target regions by core Al-Qaeda fighters but could provide a safe haven used primarily for various ‘background terrorist activities’ such as:

- An illegal gateway to enter the EU (i.e. trafficking of radical elements, document forgery, or as a “safe” meeting point for terrorists)
- A legal gateway to enter the EU (applying for visas for normal purposes— business, education, research – then ‘disappearing from the radar screen’)
- Trafficking of goods necessary for terrorist/radical activities
- The generation of funds from various licit and illicit activities (drug trade, import/export, or for money laundering), particularly in post-conflict zones.

Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the Western Balkans, however, have been suspected of promoting or supporting a radical agenda or have employed individuals linked to terrorism who later served as “bridges” between this turbulent region and Western Europe. Although the various “funnels” for support to terrorists in Europe are intimately linked to criminal activities, there is little evidence that terrorists are involved in systematic, collaborative, and sustained criminal enterprises. Therefore, seeking formal networks and connections between organized crime and terrorists may miss the mark by assuming a model of efficiency and short-term payoff that is not applicable when referring to committed radical Salafists. Their timeframe is longer, even generational, and thus, they may take the “long view” in their attempts to acquire CBRN materials, especially fissile material, an approach missing in most organized criminal enterprises.

[Terrorist’s] timeframe is longer [than that of organized crime], even generational, and thus, they may take the “long view” in their attempts to acquire CBRN materials, especially fissile material, an approach missing in most organized criminal enterprises.

Breakout Group 4

National Efforts to Counter Enabling Environments and Control the Threat of Terrorism

Chair:

Carl Ford, Ford and Associates

Rapporteur:

Madeleine Bieri, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

Panelists:

Jean-Paul Rouiller, Counter-terrorism Unit, Federal Police Office, Switzerland

Mutlu Köseli, National Police, Ministry of Interior, Turkey

Branko Turic, Department for Terrorism and War Crimes, Ministry of Interior, Croatia

In Breakout Group 4, representatives of Turkey, Switzerland, and Croatia presented national counter-terrorism efforts in three case studies that highlighted different approaches to security, while emphasizing the need for increased international cooperation and information sharing. Although each of these cases describes a different source of terrorism, each country views its efforts as integrated in the global battle against terrorism and political violence. Turkey's long standing battle with radical movements- ranging from leftists in the 1980s and 1990s to Kurdish insurgents in the east of the country- has fueled a contemporary fight against extremist elements, both for Turkey's own security and as a part of the global war on terror. Croatia, on the other hand, joined the fight against terrorism recently and is taking on greater responsibility within the international community, specifically in response to UN Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1566.* Finally, Switzerland has taken an active role in combating terrorism directly in response to the September 11 attacks, setting up a small task force to collect and share information, and to cooperate directly with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The need to agree on a common definition of terrorism was emphasized, including whether or not to identify all acts of political violence as terrorism. This is a response to popular dissatisfaction with the perceived conflation of Islam and terrorism, because many Muslims do not view radicals who espouse violence as Muslim but instead as apostates. As a matter of counter-terror policy, this conflation both drives popular resentment and helps the radicals achieve their political aims by alienating moderate Muslims who otherwise shun violence as an expression of Islam. One of the reasons to define terrorism broadly, however, is that it gives governments greater latitude and access to resources when dealing with a wide range of destabilizing political aggressors. For Muslim majority nations such as Turkey, it is especially important to be universal in the definition, emphasizing religiously motivated or sectarian violence as opposed to "Islamic terrorism," due to the sensitivities

* UN Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and 1566 (2004) work to combat threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.

Although [Turkey, Switzerland, and Croatia] describe ...different source[s] of terrorism, each country views its efforts as integrated in the global battle against terrorism and political violence.

...many Muslims do not view radicals who espouse violence as Muslim but instead as apostates.

As a matter of counter-terror policy, [the conflation of terrorism and Islam] both drives popular resentment and helps the radicals achieve their political aims by alienating moderate Muslims who otherwise shun violence as an expression of Islam.

There is an immense need in each country to work toward balancing civil liberties/human rights and the need for good intelligence.

of the public. There is an immense need in each country to work toward balancing civil liberties/human rights and the need for good intelligence. This is also related to the tension between courts needing comprehensive evidence and intelligence agencies wishing to protect their sources. In each case, the public's perception of the fairness of the process could mean the difference between an "insider's" cooperation with authorities or harboring sympathy for terrorists.

Breakout Group 5

International Efforts to Counter Enabling Environments and Control the Threat of Terrorism

Chair:

Michel Hess, Centre for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute for Technology

Rapporteur:

David Poplack, The Fund for Peace

Panelists:

Robert Wesley, Nuclear Security Officer, IAEA

Miguel García-Herráiz Roobaert, Deputy Director for Counter-terrorism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spain

Breakout Group 5 examined international instruments to tackle Threat Convergence, specifically, the UN's global strategy to combat terrorism and the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) nuclear security program. The IAEA's nuclear security program takes a broad and comprehensive approach to controlling hundreds of nuclear plants, research reactors and conversion plants that exist throughout the world. In response to the September 11th attacks on the United States, the IAEA conducted a comprehensive evaluation of its nuclear security regime. In response to its findings, the agency then formulated a new security framework that includes provisions for implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540, a Nuclear Terrorism Action Plan, a Code of Conduct, and additional provisions for safeguarding and securing civilian and military nuclear stockpiles and transport. Despite the relatively modest budget of the program, which is \$15 million dollars in voluntary contributions, the IAEA seeks to enhance international cooperation on critical nuclear security management.

The three core activities of the program include:

1. Needs assessment and analysis
2. Prevention activities
3. Detection and response

These efforts are aimed at institutionalizing the global initiative and enhancing cooperation around nuclear security, coordinating at the national, international, and regional levels, and promoting global participation in nuclear security activities.

The international community must also work to harmonize global instruments, increase international cooperation, and enhance the global development agenda to combat terrorism without changing the objectives of sustainable development for the world's poor. The UN's Global Strategy to Combat Terrorism aims to address the threat of terrorism in a comprehensive manner, worldwide. International instruments must be used to fight all kinds of terrorism, not only global or transnational terrorism. Other types of political violence, as in Colombia for example, must be addressed. There are many international agencies doing similar work but there ex-

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ists a need for more integration, a broader consensus on the definition of terrorism, and cooperation to build state capacity to combat terrorism.

The UN global strategy includes:

1. Measures to address conditions conducive to terrorism
2. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism
3. Measures to strengthen state capacity and promote international cooperation
4. Measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law

All of this depends, first, on the will of capable states to promote and support these efforts and, second, on the capacity of developing states to incorporate these initiatives. Though politicizing terrorism and aid to fight terrorism is a frustrating reality, it does not significantly hamper international cooperation. Finally, panelists concluded that the international community must be bolder and more innovative in fighting terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

Breakout Group 6

Regional Organizations' Policy Efforts to Counter Enabling Environments and Control the Threat of Terrorism

Chair:

Patricia Taft, The Fund for Peace

Rapporteur:

Félix Baumann, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

Panelists:

George Katsirdakis, Defence and Cooperation Section, Defence Policy and Planning Division, NATO

Dimitar Jalnev, Action Against Terrorism Unit, OSCE

Matthias Sonn, Head of the Task Force for International Co-operation on Counter-terrorism, FFO, Germany

This breakout group outlined challenges facing three multilateral organizations. The outlook and responses to terrorism in the European Community, NATO, and OSCE were irrevocably changed by the bombings in London and Madrid. Previously, these organizations had dealt with terrorism as an outside phenomenon or in a piecemeal fashion, but they have since turned inward to discover home-grown terrorism from enclaves within their own societies: direct threats in their own backyards. The responses were, in many cases, swift. For example, NATO and other organizations began improving the “downstream” efforts at tactical counter-terrorism and consequence management. In addition, NATO began to focus more on the “upstream” or strategic level of countering terrorism and the factors that enable it, within member and partner countries, as well as countries outside of the Alliance.

NATO detailed six areas of improvement in the fight against terrorism, that should be “operations and mission focused,” including:

1. Specific mechanisms of crisis response
2. A new strategic concept of terrorism
3. Consulting national disarmament experts
4. Intelligence and information sharing
5. Civil emergency planning and consequence management
6. Cyber defense

The goal was to make existing relationships in the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism more operational and results-oriented by formulating concrete objectives and benchmarks of progress. The four prime areas of importance would be:

- Operational and military actions
- Civil emergency planning
- Intelligence gathering and sharing
- Border security

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A special focus [of the OSCE] has been placed on countering the enabling technology of the Internet as well as strengthening the role of the police in fighting terrorism.

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In rethinking its work with the partner states, NATO sought to revitalize the Action Plan so that countries would take more ownership and give and receive more feedback on areas of concern. This was done in an effort to make the initiative a “more actionable” action plan.

Because the OSCE has no obligatory power, the organization has been most effective in supporting and encouraging the actions of states, especially by providing resources to build capacity in member states. A special focus has been placed on countering the enabling technology of the Internet as well as strengthening the role of the police in fighting terrorism.

In December 2001, the Bucharest Plan of Action outlined four main areas to address:

- Political work
- Capacity building
- Identifying and addressing gaps in policy
- Enhancing international cooperation between international and regional organizations

The EU reacted to the 9/11 attacks by creating an Action Plan on Radicalization and Recruitment (December 2004) that focused attention on the actions member states and others could take to combat terrorism. The EU affirmed the role of the UN as a central actor in the fight against terrorism, as well as the necessity to speak clearly and with a common voice on issues related to terrorism, and emphasized the links between conflicts abroad and the existence of terrorism at home. To realize these goals, the intergovernmental body has pledged to:

- Increase community policing efforts
- Create a common European arrest warrant
- Enact uniform extradition procedures
- Produce a common lexicon to describe all forms of political violence based on religious extremism

Final Plenary Session:

Discussion of Breakout Groups, Ways Forward, and Conclusion of the Workshop

In the final plenary session, the discussion focused on the difficult aspects of combating Threat Convergence scenarios, including state capabilities and responsibilities, appropriate counter strategies, and the future of international cooperation against proliferation and terrorism. A common understanding of Threat Convergence and of focusing on the enabling conditions which facilitate the proliferation of WMD to terrorists is needed. Among these conditions are weak and failing states, but also facilitating environments within strong states, such as cultural enclaves. Unresolved grievances of the disenfranchised in strong states, as well as the failure to address striking power imbalances between the global north and south were noted as “upstream” factors influencing the growth and spread of enabling environments. The current counter-terrorism and non-proliferation architecture is premised on an outdated model of interdiction and enforcement and must begin to address the “upstream” factors such as group grievance, poverty, and injustice.

There is a strong need to improve inter-agency and international tactical intelligence sharing. Achieving the appropriate balance between the need for accurate and timely intelligence and obtaining evidence that can be used in prosecutions, as well as employing legally sound law enforcement practices, is an area in need of major cooperation. Improving tactical and legal cooperation will involve a great effort on the part of former Cold-War allies, and their new partners, to overcome decades of inattention to the threats posed by state weakness.

A ten point agenda for NATO and EAPC countries to combat Threat Convergence was laid out drawing from the findings of workshop participants:

1. Generate criteria to define and operationalize Threat Convergence categories
2. Identify "upstream" conditions that contribute to Threat Convergence
3. Generate new criteria to measure state dysfunction in WFS related to Threat Convergence
4. Create a comprehensive inventory of conditions in weak states that contribute to Threat Convergence
5. Create a comprehensive inventory of conditions in strong states that contribute to Threat Convergence
6. Create a comprehensive inventory of measures taken by the international
7. community to counter Threat Convergence
8. Establish institutional mechanisms to be in place by 2020
9. Define the role of NATO in improving state capacities to counter Threat Convergence
10. Define the roles of NATO, PfP, and the EAPC in relation to Threat Convergence challenges that are beyond the scope of their mandates
11. Establish a Threat Convergence working group within the PfP/EAPC–PAP-T framework

Above all, the workshop highlighted both practical and moral arguments that encourage strong states to consider their own security and the welfare of unstable countries and regions as inextricably intertwined. When considering their right to

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intervene, politically or militarily, in the affairs of weak states, strong states must not only consider the responsibility to protect their own citizens, but also the rights of civilians affected by the intervention. These associated responsibilities are not only related to practical measures taken by strong states but also to rhetorical and ideological measures as well.

Finally, one way ahead in the fight against Threat Convergence is to begin building global norms against the use of WMD by terrorists. Engaging the Muslim world, even radicals who may support the use of catastrophic violence, in a debate that challenges the moral basis for the use of these weapons would go far to de-legitimizing their dangerous ideology. It could also challenge misperceptions of the West among their adherents. Thus, through practical, intellectual, diplomatic, and moral actions, the threat of WMD terrorism and the enabling environments that facilitate their spread can be addressed, thereby averting catastrophic attacks in the future.

List of Abbreviations

CBRN– Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (weapons)

EAPC– Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

EU– European Union

FBI– Federal Bureau of Investigation

IAEA- International Atomic Energy Agency

IT– Information Technology

NATO– North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO– Non-Governmental Organization

OSCE– Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PAP-T– Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism

PPF– Partnership for Peace

UN– United Nations

UNSCR– United Nations Security Council Resolution

WFS– Weak and Failing States

WMD– Weapons of Mass Destruction



THE FUND FOR PEACE
1701 K Street, NW
Eleventh Floor
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 223-7940 (phone)
(202) 223-7947 (fax)
www.fundforpeace.org